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Article 6

Commentary
A NEW ERA IN THE SELECTION OF
SUPREME COURT JUDGES?©
BY JACOB ZIEGEL*

It was an adroit move on Prime Minister Stephen Harper's part
to set up an ad hoc House of Commons committee to interview Justice
Marshall Rothstein before confirmation of his appointment to the
Supreme Court of Canada by the newly elected Conservative
government. The selection procedure for appointments to the Supreme
Court was not an issue during the federal election campaign;
nevertheless, the Liberals and the Conservatives knew that an early
decision would have to be made about Justice John Major's successor in
the Supreme Court.
Justice Minister Irwin Cotler had paved the way in the summer
of 2005 by establishing an advisory committee of nine members and
asking the committee to cull a shortlist of three names from a list of
eight potential candidates handed to them by the minister. The
committee submitted its shortlist just before the election was called on
28 November 2005. After forming a government, Prime Minister Harper
could have struck a new advisory committee to show that a new broom
sweeps clean; he could also have introduced an entirely new selection
procedure. Wisely, he decided there was insufficient time for a fresh
start. According to newspaper reports, he accepted the shortlist
prepared by the advisory committee established by Cotler, and selected
as his first choice Justice Marshall Rothstein, a member of the Federal
Court of Canada.
Harper's masterful stroke was the decision to ask an all-party
committee of the House of Commons to publicly interview the
candidate before the government confirmed his appointment.
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Previously, the Conservative members of the House of Commons
Justice Committee had supported a system of parliamentary scrutiny of
Supreme Court nominees, but this was premised on a different set of
circumstances. It did not envisage a separate role for an advisory
committee, which included a representative from each of the House of
Commons' political parties, to compile a shortlist of candidates.
Harper's decision to proceed with a public hearing gave him the best of
both worlds. By convening a public hearing, he honoured his party's
commitment to transparency and earned plaudits from the media. By
selecting a candidate from the advisory committee's shortlist he made
sure that he was ideologically comfortable with the candidate and that
the Liberals could not oppose the candidate since he was produced by a
selection procedure they had themselves initiated. Justice Rothstein's
well-known conservative legal philosophy nicely mirrored Harper's
conception of the Supreme Court as an interpreter of the law and not as
a social reformer. It did no harm either that the bar held Justice
Rothstein in very high regard, not only for his competence and
conscientiousness but also for his civility to counsel appearing before
him.
Harper's announcement galvanized the Canadian media, who
were familiar with the intensive grilling that nominees to the U.S.
Supreme Court are subjected to in hearings before the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee.' Knowing, too, how hostile Conservative members
of the House of Commons were to activist judges, the media may have
anticipated some lively exchanges before the ad hoc committee. They
were also aware that Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin was on record as
strongly opposing public hearings of nominees to the Supreme Court of
Canada, as were former members of the Supreme Court, both the
present and earlier presidents of the Canadian Bar Association, and
other senior members of the bar. These critics warned repeatedly that
public hearings would politicize the Supreme Court and compromise its
independence.
Happily, these misgivings turned out to be unfounded. There
were no verbal fireworks to feed the media's appetite for confrontations

' The hearings involving Justice Samuel Alito's nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in
the fall of 2005 will have refreshed their memories about just how intrusive those hearings could be.
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and no angry exchanges.2 The Rothstein hearing was a model of
decorum and sobriety. The rules of procedure were laid out carefully at
the beginning, and there was no grandstanding or self-promotion by
individual members of the committee. Few of the questions asked could
be construed as likely to compromise Justice Rothstein's role as a future
member of the Supreme Court, and he deftly turned aside those that
might have done so without rancour or ill feeling. The judge was in fact
the star of the hearing. He charmed the members of the committee and
the large television audience with his informality, self-deprecating sense
of humour, and willingness to explain his judicial philosophy in simple
terms which were readily comprehensible even to non-lawyers. His
performance showed that future candidates for appointment to the
Supreme Court have nothing to fear from a public hearing and that the
Court itself can only benefit from a better appreciation by Canadians of
its role as the final adjudicator of Canada's public and private law
values.
I.

EARLIER
HISTORY
APPOINTMENTS

OF

SUPREME

COURT

However, my sentiments may not satisfy the skeptics who are
convinced that Canada has embarked on a course of action that can only
harm the Supreme Court's independence and impeccable reputation. It
is necessary therefore to recapitulate the sequence of events that led to
the Rothstein hearing and to explain why the critics' concerns are ill
founded.
Democratic countries in the Western hemisphere have adopted
a variety of methods for selecting the members of their highest
constitutional court or final appellate courts in civil and criminal
appeals. Broadly speaking, these methods fall under one of the
following heads: (1) appointment by the executive or constitutional head
of government without recommendation from another agency (United
Kingdom model before adoption of the Constitutional Reform Act

2 The whole hearing, which ran for some three hours, was televised live on the Cable
Public Affairs Channel (CPAC) but, so far as I know, no official transcript has been made available
for public distribution. Robert Blackwell, legal reporter for The Globe andMail, kindly loaned me
his videotape of about the first two hours of the hearing and I was able to persuade a former
student, Carlin McGoogan (JD, University of Toronto 2005) to prepare what turned out to be a
more than ample and very comprehensive summary.
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2005); (2) appointment by the executive or constitutional head of
government based on nomination by another agency (United Kingdom
model after adoption of ConstitutionalReform Act 2005, South Africa,
and Israel); (3) nomination by the executive and confirmation by the
legislature (U.S. Supreme Court model); (4) election by legislative
bodies or by popular vote (German model with respect to the Federal
Constitutional Court and widely adopted U.S. state model with respect
to election of members of state supreme courts).
Canada's system of appointments to the Supreme Court falls
into the first category and is inherited from the United Kingdom. Just as
important, appointments to the Supreme Court are not formally
enshrined in the ConstitutionAct, 1982 but are governed by an ordinary
act of Parliament, the Supreme Court Act, which was first adopted in
1875.' The Supreme Court Act provides that appointments shall be
made by the Governor-in-Council. By convention, this has been
interpreted to mean that appointments are made on the
recommendation of the incumbent prime minister. There is no formal
requirement that the prime minister must consult anyone before making
a recommendation, and the prime minister is free to ignore whatever
advice is given. There is little doubt that the prime minister's
untrammelled power of appointment and the partisanship with which it
was exercised was an important factor-perhaps the key factor-in
explaining the generally low esteem in which the Supreme Court was
held prior to the abolition of appeals from Canadian courts to the Privy
Council in London in 1949. 4
The quality of appointments has undoubtedly improved greatly
since then, and the Court has rightly been lauded for its stellar
performance since 1982 in interpreting the Canadian Charterof Rights

3See now R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 am. Supreme Court Act. There is however an unresolved
difference of opinion among constitutional scholars whether ss. 41(d) and 42 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 have entrenched all or part of the Supreme Court Act. For details see Jacob S. Ziegel,
"Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada" IRPP
Choices 5:2 (June 1999) 3 at 18-19, online: Insitute for Research on Public Policy
<http://www.irpp.org./fastrack/index.htm> Given the importance of the question, it is surprising
that the uncertainty is still not resolved.
' In Peter Russell's trenchant description, the Supreme Court before 1949 was "a
thoroughly second rate institution and treated as such by the federal government." P.H. Russell,
The JudiciaryinCanada The ThirdBranch of Government (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1987) at 387.
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and Freedoms.5 Nevertheless, it would be misleading to suggest that all
the appointments in the post- Charterera have been of top quality and
have not been diluted by the personal predilections and political biases
of prime ministers and their advisors.
II.

IMPACT OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER

This lack of accountability and transparency in the appointment
process to the nation's highest court was bad enough before 1982, but in
the eyes of many observers, it became totally unacceptable in the postCharterera. The Supreme Court had become one of the most powerful
courts in the Western hemisphere-more powerful, for example, in the
scope of its jurisdiction than the U.S. Supreme Court. The Canadian
Supreme Court has the final say on all aspects of Canada's
constitutional life and maintains its ultimate adjudicative role in the
criminal law sphere as well as in matters of private law, whether of
federal or provincial origin. Though Canadian politicians and legal
commentators were slow to appreciate the fact, it is now abundantly
clear that the open-ended norms of the Charterrequire members of the
Supreme Court to make critical policy decisions on questions affecting
the conduct of Canada's political, economic, and social affairs. This
means that selecting members of the Supreme Court involves finding
candidates with the right intellectual and personal qualities, and then
considering their constitutional philosophies in relation to the broad
spectrum of issues likely to come before the Court.
Efforts to broaden the selection procedure for appointments to
the Supreme Court had long preceded the adoption of the Canadian
Charteras part of the package of constitutional amendments considered
in the 1960s and 1970s. None of them bore fruit, however, and the
challenge was taken up again in the early 1980s by committees of the
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) and the Canadian Association of Law
Teachers (CALT). Their concern was more about the merit of judicial
appointees than about greater political accountability. Both
organizations issued important reports in 1986.6 Both reports contained

' Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter.
6 For details see Jacob S. Ziegel, "Federal Judicial Appointments in Canada: The Time is
Ripe for Change" (1987) 36 U.T.L.J. 1.
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substantially similar recommendations for the establishment of advisory
committees to advise the federal government on appointments to the
provincial superior courts, the Federal Court of Canada, and the
Supreme Court.
The Mulroney administration partially implemented the
recommendations involving judicial appointments below the Supreme
Court level. However, neither Mulroney in the 1980s nor Chr6tien in the
1990s showed any interest in diluting their appointive powers with
respect to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the pressures continued to
mount. Newspaper commentators and editorialists were especially
vociferous in articulating the case for a more transparent and
accountable system of appointments to the Supreme Court.
III.

THE MARTIN ERA INITIATIVES

Even before succeeding Jean Chr6tien as prime minister in
November 2003, Paul Martin publicly committed himself to curing the
democratic deficit in the existing system of Supreme Court
appointments, though he never made it clear how far he was willing to
go. He invited the House of Commons Justice Committee in February
2004 to provide him expeditiously with the committee's own
recommendations. Though the committee produced a slim report in
record time in May of that year, 7 there was little consensus among the
political parties about the desirable reforms. The Liberals, and
seemingly the New Democrats, favoured some type of advisory
committee but were opposed to public hearings for nominees. The Bloc
Qu6b6cois favoured much stronger input from the provinces and a
participatory role for the justice committee. The Conservative members
emphasized the need for public hearings and parliamentary ratification.
Justice Minister Irwin Cotler and the Liberal members of the
Justice Committee were hostile to any suggestion of public confirmation
hearings. The minister confirmed his opposition when he unveiled the
government's response to the committee's report in April 2005 and

' See Canada, The Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process
(Ottawa: The Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, 2004) (Chair: Derek Lee), online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/committee
publication.aspx?com =8795&lang= l&sourceid =84157>.
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again during that same year.8 Though the government accepted the
appropriateness of some kind of an advisory committee, even here the
minister was determined to ensure that the committee's mandate was
carefully circumscribed. The committee, as appointed, had nine
members: a nominee from each of the recognized political parties in the
House of Commons, a retired judge, a nominee of the provincial
attorneys general from one of whose jurisdictions the new member of
the Supreme Court was to be appointed, a nominee of the provincial law
societies of the same provinces, and two distinguished laypersons who
were neither judges nor lawyers. Significantly, the committee was not
left free to compile its own list of potential candidates. Instead, the
justice minister provided the committee with a list of eight candidates
from which the committee was asked to select three for submission to
the federal government. The minister's rationale for these restrictions
was that the committee lacked the resources and the expertise to locate
suitable candidates within a reasonable time frame. The committee was
duly appointed with these terms of reference and presented the federal
government with its list of three nominees shortly before the election
was called on 28 November 2005.
IV.

A UNIQUELY CANADIAN SOLUTION?

The question that now needs to be addressed is whether Harper,
no doubt greatly to his own surprise, has found the perfect formula for
combining the broad and long-standing public support for an advisory
committee with the Conservative party's commitment to public hearings.
We may not learn the answer until we know which government holds the
reins of power when the next vacancy arises in the Supreme Court. This
may not be until 2012, the mandatory retirement date of the oldest
member of the current Supreme Court.
It is possible, of course, that an intervening administration will
reject Harper's ingenious solution and adopt a new appointive system of
its own or revert to the Liberals' penchant for an advisory committee
sans public hearing. I doubt, however, that a future administration will
want to invest the political capital necessary to reinvent this peculiarly

8 See Department of Justice, News Release, Government of Canada Moves to Reform
Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process, (7 April 2005); Department of Justice, and News
Release, New Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process Launched, (8 August 2005).
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Canadian wheel-a wheel not symmetrically circular, to be sure, but
mobile nonetheless and capable of reaching its appointed destination.
The critics will no doubt complain that the two-step process adopted by
the Conservatives is a sham, as indeed would have been the Liberals'
preferred one-step advisory committee procedure. The hybrid Harper
approach, it will be argued, is a sham in two respects: first, because the
powers of the advisory committee established by the Liberals were so
circumscribed that they were more form than substance, and second,
because of restrictions on the types of questions the parliamentary
committee members were allowed to put to the nominee at the public
hearing. Other critics may object that the belt and suspender approach
adopted by Harper, while explicable in its particular context, should not
be endorsed on a long-term basis because it is duplicative and wasteful.
Canada, it will be argued, should embrace either one or the other
approach to ensure high quality appointments to the Supreme Court,
but not both.
I concede there is substance to these criticisms. But on balance,
they do not undermine the case for combining the role of an advisory
committee with the function of a public hearing. My reasons are
outlined below.
As perceived in the earlier reports addressing the need for an
advisory committee, the role of the committee was to ensure that the
nominee was preeminently qualified, intellectually and otherwise, for
membership of the Court and to avoid partisan appointments of less
qualified candidates by the federal government. As a member of the
CALT committee that reported in 1986, I can attest to the fact that the
ideology of candidates for appointment to the Court did not figure
prominently in the committee's deliberations. Perhaps somewhat
naively, we assumed that if a candidate had the right intellectual and
personal qualities, he or she would also make broadly acceptable policy
decisions on the Charter and other sensitive branches of public law.
Those were the early days when the Court's expansive normative
options in interpreting Charterprovisions were not as obvious as they
are today. The advantages of the advisory committee model over the
confirmation model is that it requires the committee to be proactive and
not reactive, as is true of the confirmation model. A confirmation
hearing can only approve or reject, and may lack the power to reject
altogether if the executive holds majority representation on the
committee. This disabling feature of the confirmation model is
illustrated by the confirmation last year of Judge Samuel Alito, who was
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appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court despite strong opposition by the
minority Democratic senators in the Senate.
V.

CHANGING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Had the federal government accepted the CBA and CALT
recommendations in the 1980s in favour of an advisory committee
structure, the pressure for a confirmation process might never have
arisen. 9 However, the Mulroney and Chrtien governments missed the
opportunity, and the political environment has changed significantly
since then. The Canadian public today is more conscious of the powers
of the Supreme Court and much more suspicious of critical appointive
decisions made behind closed doors. Marshall Rothstein's hearing has
also confirmed that there is great public interest in the personalities of
the members of the Supreme Court and a desire for better
understanding of the Court's work. Hearings therefore serve an
important educational function, for the members of the Court as well as
for the members of the Justice Committee and the public at large. It
may well be true that if the selection committee has done its work well,
the nominee will sail through the hearing with flying colours. This does
not mean that useful questions cannot be asked by the members of the
Justice Committee. The Rothstein hearing was an innovation and one
should not be too critical of the lack of sophistication in the committee
members' questions."0 There are many aspects of the Court's work that
can be intelligently canvassed in nomination hearings without
compromising the candidate's role as a future member of the Supreme
Court, and members of the committee should be encouraged to ask
them."

9 Neither the CBA nor the CALT reports recommended public confirmation hearings. The
author was a member of the CALT committee.
"oThis would be my response to the comment attributed to Justice Major that he thought
some of the committee members' questions at the hearings were "inane."
" To give some examples: (1) How realistic is it to expect every member of the Supreme
Court to read conscientiously all the materials on each of the hundred or so cases in which leave to
appeal is granted by the Supreme Court and if it is not realistic should the Court reduce the
number of cases it is willing to hear? (2) Is the impression correct that the common law members of
the Supreme Court do not involve themselves deeply in civil law appeals coming from Quebec but
defer to the expertise of the civilian colleagues on the Court, and if it is correct, is this something we
should worry about? (3) How significant is the role of law clerks in the preparation of Supreme
Court judgments and should their role receive greater public recognition?

